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INTRODUCTION

Tribal, state, and federal environmental regulatory jurisdiction
over natural resources development and other business activities on
Indian reservations and other Indian lands eludes precise definition.

The unique attributes of tribal sovereignty and the relationships between tribes and states, the federal government, and private business,

together with the lack of clear direction or standards of review from
the courts give rise to jurisdictional uncertainties for those involved

in undertakings with environmental impacts on Indian lands. Jurisdictional cross-currents can confound the expectations and understandings of developers on Indian lands. These uncertainties demand
specialized attention by developers on tribal lands; developers must
consider these unique issues in ascertaining environmental compliance
obligations.
This article is intended to present a practice-oriented discussion
covering the broad spectrum of environmental issues affecting natural
resources development and other projects on Indian lands. The matters addressed here are applicable not only to natural resources development projects, but also to any type of development on Indian
lands, incluaing the waste treatment and disposal facilities that have
received so much media attention in the recent past. This article serves
to discuss the present day delineation of tribal, federal, and state
environmental regulatory authority over activities on Indian lands.
The interrelationship of these three jurisdictional spheres of influence
present new and different challenges than those arising in transactions

not involving Indian tribes, Indian lands, or Indian reservations. Of
course, certain environmental compliance issues arise regardless of
the location of the planned facility, and are common to Indian and
non-Indian related projects. This article, however, does not present
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/2
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a comprehensive analysis of such matters. Rather, the emphasis here
is on environmental regulatory complications more unique to Indian
lands.
Section I of this article examines the sources of, and limitations
on, tribal power to impose environmental regulation on development
activities. Section II examines specific permissible exercises of tribal
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians, including zoning, health and
safety regulation, environmental protection, and other matters addressed by the courts to date. This section also discusses the authority
Congress has delegated to tribes under a number of significant federal
environmental statutory and regulatory schemes. Section III discusses
the potential exercise of state regulatory jurisdiction, raising the specter of concurrent and potentially conflicting jurisdiction. Section IV
briefly addresses the role of federal regulation of natural resource
leasing and development on Indian lands in environmental regulation.
Section V touches on contractual obligations that may arise and affect
environmental regulation. This discussion is designed to assist developers doing business on Indian lands in understanding some of
the particularized complexities of transactions with Indian tribes and
the concomitant environmental compliance considerations that result.
II.
A.

TimuA

REGULATORY POWER: SOURCES AND LIMITATIONS

Sources of Tribal Authority
The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States
is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.. . . [Tihe relation of the Indians to the United States
is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist
nowhere else.I

These words of Chief Justice John Marshall in 1831 continue to describe accurately the status of Indian tribes and Indian lands today.
Indian tribes, long considered both sovereigns and wards subject to
the supervision and protection of the federal government, derive powers from three principal sources: inherent tribal sovereignty, treaties
with the United States, and delegation by the United States Congress
through both general and specific legislative schemes.2 Although not
discussed here, tribes also may derive authority through cooperative
agreements with states or federal land management agencies.

1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
2. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-65 (1981); United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978).
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1. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty
In an early 1800's trilogy of still-influential cases, Chief Justice
Marshall established that Indian tribes possessed powers of inherent
sovereignty in one federal system that arose from tribes' status as
independent nations before and at the time of the European colonization of North America.3 "Indian tribes are unique aggregations
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory

....

",4

However, by virtue of Indian tribes' now dependent

status within the federal system, their powers of inherent sovereignty
are "necessarily diminished."' In general, however, most tribes retain
certain inherent sovereign powers. 6 A tribe's governmental powers
over its members are well established. Except as withdrawn, limited,
or modified by treaty or statute, a tribe has inherent authority over
tribal members within its territory.' However, a tribe's powers over
Indians who are members of other tribes are similar to the narrower
powers it enjoys over non-Indians. 8
Inherent tribal powers to regulate non-Indian activities on the
reservation are less clearly defined, but the existence of such powers
is nonetheless well established. 9 Two propositions support Indian tribes'
retaining power to regulate non-members: first, tribes possess the rights
of a landowner; and second, tribes may exercise local self-government
and regulate the relations between its members and other persons,
consistent with federal law.' 0
Tribes retain certain inherent governmental powers that continue
to be defined as they pertain to non-Indian activity on the reservation.
In general, tribes may regulate "through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relation3. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
4. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
5. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 (tribes may be "denominated [as] domestic dependent nations.").
6. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (Navajo tribal prosecution of tribal member does not
bar federal prosecution for the same offense under the double jeopardy clause, since a tribe's
source of power to try its members is derived not from federal government, but from inherent,
unextinguished tribal sovereignty).
7. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at
323.
8. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
9. Compare Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) with Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); see also Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
10. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 48-49 (1934) (citing 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
465, 466 (1821)); see also Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 478 (9th
Cir. 1985). Land tenure within certain reservations may limit tribal power to exclude. For
example, owners of land conveyed to non-Indians prior to the establishment of a reservation
should not be subject to ouster, and may not be subject to regulation, by a tribe.
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ships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."" As indicated, tribes retain a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty-the taxing power. A tribe also
retains the "inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.' 2 Justice
Scalia recently described the "power reserved to tribes over the conduct of non-Indians within their reservations" as being "very narrow.' 3 Despite its "narrow" applicability, tribal authority remains
an important consideration for natural resources development on Indian lands. Attributes of inherent tribal sovereign power continue to
be defined by the courts. Specific exercises of tribal powers will be
discussed in Section II of this article.
2. Treaties with the United States
For many years, the chief instrument of federal power over Indians was the treaty, made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.' 4 Consequently, many tribal rights in reservation
lands are grounded in treaties between the United States and the tribe.
While most treaties limit or preserve tribal powers derived from inherent sovereign status, treaties have been interpreted to supply, confirm, or define tribal authority over non-Indians. 5 "Implicit in ...
treaty terms . . . was the understanding that the internal affairs of

the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever
tribal government existed."' 6 Courts are disinclined to find that a
I1.Montana, 450 U.S. at 565; see also Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 389-92 (1904)
(power to regulate commerce and raise revenue through licensing and permitting schemes). A
well recognized attribute of tribal sovereignty is taxation. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1985); Merrion v. JicariUa Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 137 (1982); Colville, 447 U.S. at 152; Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 46
(1934) ("Chief among the powers of sovereignty recognized as pertaining to an Indian tribe
is the power of taxation. Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this power may be
exercised over members of the tribe and over non-members, so far as such non-members may
accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be attached as conditions.").
12. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
13. County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 692 (1992).
14. See F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF FrDRAL INDL&N LAW, 33-46 (1942). The year 1871

marked the end of the treaty-making era between the United States and Indian tribes. However,
the United States' obligations under Indian treaties remain unimpaired. See Act of March 3,
1871, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982); United States v. Berry, 4 F. 779 (D. Colo. 1880). Even treaty
provisions that appear dated may have continued vitality. See Tsosie v. United States, 825
F.2d, 393, 403 (Fed. Cit. 1987) (enforcing a provision of the Treaty of June 1, 1868 with the
Navajo Tribe which required the United States to reimburse Navajo Indians for injuries and
loss resulting from the acts of white "bad men").
15. See Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207
(1983) ("1854 Treaty did not confer upon the [Lac Courte Oreilles) Band power to restrict
public fishing and hunting in navigable lakes" on the reservation).
16. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959); see also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324;
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
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treaty divests tribal power where the treaty is susceptible of an interpretation preserving or establishing tribal authority over non-Indians.'7
Treaties may create or secure important tribal powers over natural resources and business activities." Treaties have been held to
exclude State authority to regulate non-Indian tribal fishing and hunting on reservation lands, off-reservation fishing by tribal members,' 9
and to support tribal authority to exclude regulation of work conditions in a tribal enterprise by the United States Department of Labor.20 Treaties generally do not contain "boilerplate" provisions
governing tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians or over natural resources development projects. In order to define a specific tribe's
powers over particular activities, one should consider applicable treaor limit tribal authority
ties to determine whether their terms expand
2
over non-Indian reservation activities. '
3. Executive Orders
Indian reservations were created by treaty, statute, and between
1855 and 1927,22 by Executive Order. The particular organic action
establishing a reservation may illuminate the scope of tribal authority
over the lands involved. While potentially material in defining rights
prior to 1927, the fact alone that a reservation had Executive Order
origins rather than treaty or statute, generally is not held to diminish
tribal powers. Tribal civil regulatory authority over Executive Order
lands today appears comparable to authority over treaty or con-

17. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 731 F.2d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174
(1973).
18. See F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDLAN LAw 67 (1982).
19. See Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 236 (9th Cir. 1974) (1855 Treaty with the Yakima
Tribe provided tribe with regulatory authority, off-reservation, where the "right of taking fish
at all usual and accustomed places" was granted by the Treaty).
20. Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 710 (10th Cir. 1982)
21. It is important to note, however, that Congress may override treaty rights through
legislation. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968);
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556 (1903) (treaty abrogation is a political question);
United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986).
Of course, Congressional power to abrogate treaties is not limited to Indian affairs. See, e.g.,
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
22. In 1927, Congress enacted legislation limiting the authority of the Executive to change
reservation boundaries or implicitly eliminate reservations without congressional approval. See
25 U.S.C. § 398d (1988). In an enactment peculiar to Arizona and New Mexico, Congress
prohibited the creation of executive order reservations in those states in 1918. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 211 (1988). Prior to those dates, the nature of title held by tribes on Executive Order reservations, and perhaps the breadth of tribal authority over those lands was perhaps more
ephemeral than treaty or congressionally-established reservations.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/2
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gressionally established reservations. 23 Nevertheless, the circumstances
surrounding issuance of Executive Orders may impact the scope of
tribal authority over the lands involved.
4.

Congressionally Delegated Authority

The Supreme Court has confirmed congressional power to delegate regulatory authority to Indian tribes. In United States v. Mazurie,24 for example, the Court upheld a broad congressional delegation
to tribes of authority to regulate liquor sales on tribal and fee lands
on the Wind River Reservation.
In recent years, Congress has authorized delegations of regulatory authority to tribes under a growing number of environmental
regulatory statutes. One of the first such delegations appears in the
Clean Air Act 25 where Congress initially delegated to Indian tribes
the authority to exercise certain controls, comparable to powers granted
also to States, over reservation air quality. 26 Under the Clean Air
Act's "non-degradation" provisions, tribes may control the quality
of their reservation airshed through designation of air quality standards acceptable on the reservation. Such designations may affect
development both on and near the reservation. 27 Several other federal
environmental statutes contemplate administrative delegations of a
regulatory role for Indian tribes with demonstrated ability to administer such programs. 23
In addition to specific congressionally delegated authority, courts
have inferred delegations of regulatory authority or ousters of State
authority from broad federal policies encouraging the exercise of tribal
regulatory authority. 29 The Supreme Court has recognized that the

23. See CoHEN, supra note 18, at 127-28; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601
(1963). Few decisions directly address distinctions between tribal powers over Executive Order
reservation and most were created by statute or treaty. However, when the Supreme Court
affirmed the power of the Jicarilla Tribe to impose severance taxes on non-Indian lessees' oil
and gas production within its Executive Order reservation, it based its decision on "the Tribe's
general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction .... " Mernon v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. at 137. Notably, the Court did not address the energy
companies' arguments that the Executive Order origins of the reservation limited tribal authority. Nevertheless, any pertinent Executive Order and supporting administrative records should
be reviewed to define tribal powers.
24. 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1988) (tribes may redesignate reservation.ar quality classifications). As discussed in Section II.D. infra, Congress broadened the delegation to tribes
in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
27. See Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Crow Tribe
of Indians v. EPA, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
28. See Section lI.D., infra.
29. Cf. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (applicable statutes evidence "a firm federal
policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development").
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federal government is "firmly committed to the goal of promoting
tribal self-government, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes."30
Federal courts and tribal advocates have derived support for broad
delegation of authority primarily from the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 (IRA), 31 the Indian Financing Act of 1974,32 the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,11 and the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).3 4 While none of these statutes declare exclusive tribal jurisdiction or specifically oust state power, several decisions interpret them as establishing policies that support the
preemption of state regulation or support federal or tribal jurisdiction. 35 However, recent Supreme Court decisions limit the extent to
which such broad federal policies promoting tribal self-sufficiency
may expand tribal powers or restrict state jurisdiction.3 6 These recent
decisions suggest that, in the absence of specific congressional enactments, traditional or historic tribal regulation of the specific activity may be more probative of the scope of inherent tribal powers
than broad statutory proclamations of policy favoring tribal self-government.

Developers must consider these sources of regulatory power as
part of the planning process. The study of these matters, focussing

on the specific land, reservation, and/or tribe involved, will provide
important insights info the opportunities and potential pitfalls of a

30. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334-35. Of course, the present
federal policy promoting tribal self-government was not always the guiding policy. Statutes still
on the books may override such policy. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation,
112 S. Ct. 683, 691-92 (1992) (specific General Allotment Act of 1887 and Burke Act of 1906
provisions are not overridden by general Indian Reorganization Act policies adopted in 1934).
31. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988 & Supp. If 1990); the Supreme Court stated the "intent
and purpose of the Reorganization Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to
give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism ...
"' Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934)).
32. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Section 1451 says "[ilt is hereby
declared to be the policy of Congress . . . to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both
physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the
utilization and management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard of
living from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities." Id. § 1451.
33. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
34. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (the ICRA evidences a federal "policy of furthering Indian self-government"); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978).
35. See, e.g., Washington, Dep't of Ecology v. United States EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1471
(9th Cir. 1985) (in support of EPA delegation of RCRA program authority to a tribe relying
on a federal "policy of encouraging tribal self-government in environmental matters.").
36. See Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (Court rejected contentions that general federal policies promoting tribal economic development and self-government should contribute to the ouster of state taxing jurisdiction); County of Yakima v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/2

8

Stern: Environmental Compliance Considerations for Developers of Indian

1993

DEVELOPING INDIAN LANDs

project. Of course, such insights are not limited to environmental
regulatory consideration. Rather, the information will be useful in all
of the planning, negotiation, development, operational, and reclamation phases of the project. The specific research should also address the other matters discussed below.
B.

Limitations on Tribal Sovereign Powers

Indian tribal sovereignty is not unfettered. "Tribal sovereignty
is subject to limitation by specific treaty provisions, by statute at the
will of Congress, by portions of the Constitution found explicitly
binding on the tribes, or by implication due to the tribes' dependent
status. ''"1This section analyzes these and other limitations on the
exercise of tribal powers, including federal preemption, geographical
limitations, and the ICRA. No single factor is determinative of the
possible extent of, or limitations on, tribal authority over non-Indian
activities. Courts generally inquire into all of the facts and circumstances behind each assertion of tribal authority. This "totality of
circumstances" approach counsels in favor of full examination of all
potential limitations on tribal authority. The examination should include both generally and specifically applicable limitations. 8
1. The Dependent Status of Indian Tribes
The Supreme Court has found implicit in Indian tribes' dependent status certain limitations upon the exercise of tribal authority.
The extent of those limitations depends on the context in which the
issue arises.3 9 The Supreme Court has described the status of tribes
as:
"an anomalous one and of complex character," for despite
their partial assimilation into American culture, the tribes have

37. Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981);
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-66 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 323 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). This same
type of analysis is used to determine the contours of state jurisdiction over non-Indian reservation activities. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980);
see Section III, infra.
38. Certain legislative schemes are applicable only to specific tribes or groups of tribes.
See, e.g., Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (1988). These specifically tailored enactments may affect the regulatory regime applicable to the reservation. See,
e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1708 (1988) (subjecting lands purchased for Rhode Island Indians' benefit
to state civil and criminal jurisdiction). Accordingly, in addition to general principles of federal
Indian law, one must consider any statutes, treaties, judicial decisions, or executive actions
that may be directed to a particular tribe or to a class of tribes.
39. Compare Montana v. United States. 450 U.S. 544 (1981) with Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
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retained "a semi-independent position ... not as States, not
as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating
their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought
under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose
limits they resided.' ,4
Because of Indian tribes' "anomalous" status as "not .. . possessed

of the full attributes of sovereignty," courts struggle constantly with
the extent to which inherent tribal powers remain, or alternatively,
have been diminished as a result of Indian tribes' dependent status.
In Montana v. United States,41 the Supreme Court considered
inherent limitations on tribal power in determining the source and
scope of the Crow Tribe's power to "regulate hunting and fishing
by non-Indians on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple
by non-Indians." 42 The Court found no treaty-based tribal power to
regulate non-members' fishing and hunting. However, in evaluating
other potential sources of tribal power, the Court enunciated a threepronged "Montana test" for determining inherent tribal powers:
[Ejxercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.
A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity,4 the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.

1

The Court held that the effect of the non-Indian hunting and fishing
on the Crow Tribe's vital interests was insufficient to warrant tribal

40. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (quoting
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973)); see also United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
41. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
42. Id. at 547.
43. Id.
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hunting and fishing regulation under the first prong of the "Montana
test;" consequently, tribal regulation was inconsistent with dependent
status. Despite the result, the Montana test remains the primary
touchstone for consideration of tribal assertions of regulatory authority over non-Indian activity."
Tribal dependent status played a significant role in the Court's
decision in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation.4 5 In Brendale, four members of the Court held that the tribes'
exercise of zoning authority over nonmembers, predominately nonIndian, was inconsistent with the tribes' dependent status:
[R]egulations of "the relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe" is necessarily inconsistent with the
tribes, and therefore tribal sovereignty over such matters of
"external relations" is divested. 46
While the three opinions in Brendale resulted in ouster of tribal zoning power only as to non-Indian owned fee lands in the predominately
non-Indian portion of the reservation, the decision suggests that the
Rehnquist Court may view the dependent status of tribes as sharply
limiting tribal powers over non-Indians on fee landsY7
2. Comprehensive Federal Regulatory Schemes: Preemption
of Tribal Authority
Tribal regulatory authority may be preempted by comprehensive
federal regulatory schemes, even without express congressional divestiture of tribal authority." In some respects, the analysis is not
unlike the inquiry as to whether tribes are divested of certain powers
as the result of their dependent status.

44. Before Montana, the Court had stated, in considering the validity of state taxation,

a different test: inherent tribal authority is retained by Indian tribes "unless divested. . .by
federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status." Colville, 447 U.S. at 152. Since
Montana, the courts generally have followed the Court's test in that case.
45. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). Brendale involved a challenge to the tribe's zoning authority
over non-Indian fee lands in developed and undeveloped portions of the reservation. In three
separate opinions, the Court formed two different alliances to reach different results. The tribe's
authority was upheld as to the primitive position of the reservation, while the tribe's authority
was struck down as to the developed portion of the reservation.
46. 492 U.S. at 427.
47. Brendale is discussed in greater detail in Section II.A.
48. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1986) (treaty rights are abrogated
by Eagle Protection Act); United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1004 (1980) (Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668(a)-(d) (1988 & Supp. n 1990), protects
national conservation interests which outweigh tribal hunting rights preserved by treaty). But
see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 151-52 (1982) (Court rejected argument
that tribal taxation of oil and gas operations conflicted with national energy policy).
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In Rice v. Rehner,49 the Supreme Court held that the State of
California, pursuant to a federal scheme, could require a federally
licensed Indian trader who operated a general store on an Indian
reservation to obtain a state liquor license. "[Tiradition simply has
not recognized [an] . . . inherent [tribal] authority in favor of liquor
regulation by Indians." 0 To the contrary, "[tihere can be no doubt
that Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area [liquor sales]. In the area of liquor regulation, we
find no 'congressional enactments demonstrating a firm federal policy
5
of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development."' '1
In effect, the Court found that federal legislation preempted tribal
sovereign powers.
A district court held similarly in UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally.5 2 In Benally, a tribal court had attempted to exercise jurisdiction
over a dispute concerning an accidental off-reservation discharge of
radioactive by-product material. The district court stated that tribal
jurisdiction "conflicts with the superior federal interest in regulating
the production of nuclear power." 53 Although greater emphasis has
been focused on federal preemption of state regulation on the reservation, these decisions reflect that federal regulatory schemes may
also preempt the exercise of tribal regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction.54
3. The Geographical Component of Sovereignty: Another
Limitation
Reservation boundaries and land titles may also play a role in
delineating or limiting tribal powers. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is "a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty . . "" Inherent tribal sovereign powers,

49. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
50. Rice v. Relmer, 463 U.S. 713, 722 (1983).
51. Id. at 724 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143
(1980)); see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 545 (1975). In Rice, the Court reaffirmed that the tribal liquor regulation upheld in Mazurie was based on a specific delegation
of congressional authority, not an independent tribal sovereign regulatory authority over liquor.
Rice, 463 U.S. at 721-22.
52. 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981).
53. Id. at 1052.
54. See also Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S.
765, 786 (1984) (section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e), divested tribal
authority to grant or deny rights-of-way for hydroelectric project facilities).
55. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980); see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at 166 (Brennan,
J. dissenting) ("[Tihere is a significant territorial component to tribal power. Thus, state taxes
on the off-reservation activities of Indians are permissible, and tribal laws will often govern
the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians." (citations omitted)); Brendale v. Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 457 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court has affirmed and
reaffirmed that tribal sovereignty is in large part geographically determined.").
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therefore, generally extend to the limits of the reservation, and in

certain circumstances may be exercised over non-Indians on fee lands
within reservation boundaries.56 In spite of this territorial aspect of
tribal sovereignty, some tribes have successfully contended that treaties permit the assertion of tribal powers over tribal members beyond
reservation boundaries, particularly where the off-reservation
action
57
could affect reservation lands or other tribal interests.

Tribes recently have begun to assert jurisdiction over the off-

reservation activities of non-Indians. For example, in 1988, the Navajo Tax Commission proposed a draft tax policy for the "Eastern

Navajo Agency" area to the east and south of its recognized reservation. The policy sought to tax non-Indian business activities in
that area, including lands undisputedly outside reservation boundaries. Because of pending litigation over whether certain of the Eastern
Navajo Agency lands are included within its Reservation, the Navajo

Nation has not acted to finalize the proposed policy.
To support extra-territorial assertions, tribes have relied on dicta
in DeCoteau v. District County Court" and California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians,5 9 stating that the federal "Indian Country"
statute 6° applies to questions of both criminal and civil jurisdiction.
However, those cases, and others citing them, involve on-reservation
matters only. 6' To date no court has held that the "Indian Country"
statute, which defines "Indian Country" for criminal jurisdiction purposes, authorizes or permits the assertion of tribal civil jurisdiction
over off-reservation activities of non-Indians on fee lands. Tribal authority over off-reservation "Indian Country" will be unclear until
the issue is resolved by the courts or Congress. 62

56. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 142, 102 S. Ct. 894, 904 (1982); cf. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S.
529, 538 (1976) (Congress' proprietary power over federal lands includes authority to regulate
adjacent lands under the property clause of the Constitution where necessary to protect federal
interests).
57. See, e.g., Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
58. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
59. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) (defines "Indian country" to include all lands within the
boundaries of Indian reservations, on and off-reservation Indian allotments, and dependent
Indian communities outside reservations).
61. See, e.g., Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967
(10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
62. These matters are presented in Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman,
U.S.D.C. Cause No. CIV 86-1442M (D.N.M.). The Ninth Circuit has rejected such off-reservation jurisdictional arguments in the context of state taxation assertions. See Yakima Indian
Nation v. County of Yakima, 903 F.2d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
Resolution of such issues may be informed, in certain circumstances, by congressional action
intended to open reservations to settlement or to terminate reservations. Surplus lands or allotment acts, prevalent from 1871 through 1928, when federal Indian policy sought to assimilate
Indians into white society, resulted, in some circumstances, in a diminishment of tribal authority
and termination of some reservations. The ultimate result of the allotment statutes is unsus-
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The Indian Civil Rights Act

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 196863 (ICRA) represents an express congressional limitation upon the exercise of tribal powers. Prior
to the enactment of ICRA, tribes "historically [had] been regarded
as unconstrained by ... constitutional provisions framed specifically
as limitations on federal or state authority."' 4 Through ICRA, Congress exercised its "plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate
the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess."16 The primary purpose of ICRA is to protect tribal members
from abuses of tribal power, however, ICRA protects all "persons."' '
ICRA provides in part:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall

(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property
without due process of law .... 67
This provision imposes restrictions upon tribal governments which are
"similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment."'6 Although rights guaranteed by

this section are not coextensive with constitutional guarantees, courts
interpret the section in light of federal constitutional law decisions. 69
However, tribal authority derived from congressional delegation arceptible of generalized description: "The modern legacy of the surplus land Acts has been a
spate of jurisdictional disputes between state and federal officials as to which sovereign has
authority over lands that were opened by the Acts and have since passed out of Indian ownership." Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 467 (1984). The Supreme Court recently found the
extent to which land had passed into non-Indian fee ownership as a result of the allotment
process to be critical to whether the Yakima Tribe retained zoning authority over fee lands
within the reservation. See Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (Stevens,
J.). Accordingly, although perhaps not a principled distinction susceptible of even application,
the character of land or community may be a factor in resolving jurisdictional disputes. See
also Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
63. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
64. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); see, e.g., Talton v. Mayes,
163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
65. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56.
66. Id. at 61; see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. at 191 ("persons"
includes Indians and non-Indians).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
68. Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 57.
69. Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1988) (ICRA
acts as a "conduit to transmit federal constitutional protections"); Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1047 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978);
see UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358, 361 (D.N.M. 1981); but see United
States v. Strong, 778 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985) (limitations "are identical to those imposed
by the fourth amendment").
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guably may be subject
to Fifth Amendment restrictions, in addition
70
to ICRA limitations.

5. Treaty Provisions: Limitations on Tribal Authority Over
Non-Indians
Treaties may limit tribal authority over non-Indians. However,
treaties generally are construed liberally in order to preserve tribal
powers under the rule that ambiguities in treaty provisions are to be
resolved in favor of the Indians. 7 Consequently, treaties seldom have
been held to restrict tribal powers to any great degree. 72 Although73
treaties likely will be construed to preserve tribal rights and powers,
any investigation of tribal powers and limitations must consider applicable treaties.
III.

SCOPE OF TRIBAL POWER: PERMISSIBLE EXERCISES OF TRIBAL
REGULATORY JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDLANS

Tribal assertions of regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians have
extended into many spheres involving environmental protection, including zoning, 74 health and safety regulation," taxation,76 and land
use planning.7 Many other matters remain unexamined by the courts.7
This section analyzes the scope of tribal authority in areas of interest
or concern to natural resources developers and other businesses. While

70. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 558 n.12 (1975) (fifth amendment may
be available to remedy arbitrary tribal exercise of federally delegated authority); United States
v. Morgan, 614 F.2d 166, 171 (8th Cir. 1980).
71. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899) (disparity between federal and
tribal sophistication in negotiation and expertise in written communication). A similar rule of
construction applies to federal statutes. See County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 683 (1992).
72. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 731 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd,
471 U.S. 195 (1985); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959); Babbitt Ford, Inc.
v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); UNC
Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981).
73. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Rice v. Rehner,
463 U.S. 713 (1983); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); but see Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985) (applying rule of statutory
construction that statutes must be read to give effect to every provision).
74. Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982).
75. Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982).
76. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
77. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982).
78. However, courts have considered other matters of limited importance. See, e.g., Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 593-94, 599 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 926 (1984) (Navajo Tribe has authority consistent with federal policy to regulate
automobile repossession procedures where a tribal member's vehicle is threatened).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1993

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 28 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 2
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVIII

most cases uphold tribal assertions of traditional police power authority, recent Supreme Court decisions suggest higher hurdles may
confront tribal regulation in the future.
A.

Zoning Authority

The Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation 9 portends a narrower scope for tribal
zoning powers than earlier lower court decisions had suggested. Brendale considered the Yakima Tribe's power to zone two discrete parcels
in two markedly different portions of the reservation. Although members of the Court wrote three separate opinions, a majority affirmed
tribal zoning power in a "closed" area of the reservation, where
population and land ownership were overwhelmingly Indian, and
overturned tribal zoning in an "open" area of the reservation, where
land ownership and population were predominately non-Indian.
Writing for a four justice plurality, Justice White first rejected
the Yakima Indian Nation's treaty-based jurisdictional assertions. He
then examined the Court's Montana decision and determined that the
8
Nation had no authority to zone lands held in fee by non-Indians.w
Justice White reaffirmed prior decisions which held that tribal sovereignty is divested to the extent tribal powers are asserted over nonmembers of the Tribe. 8 ' "Winder the general principle enunciated in
Montana, the Yakima Nation has no authority to impose its zoning
ordinance on the fee lands [at issue].'

' s2

Thereafter, Justice White

rejected application of the exceptions discussed in Montana. While
tribes "may" retain authority over some types of non-Indian activities
or fee lands under Montana, Justice White concluded, "[tlhe governing principle is that the tribe has no authority itself, by way of
tribal ordinance or actions in tribal courts, to regulate the use of fee
land.',83

The clarity of Justice White's plurality is muddied by the two
other opinions filed in Brendale. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
O'Connor, represented the swing opinion in Brendale which resulted
in the different results between the "open" and "closed" portions
of the Yakima Reservation. Justice Stevens began his analysis by noting that "[zioning is the process whereby a community defines its

79. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). The pivotal opinion of Justice Stevens in Brendale suggested
that tribal zoning power may be determined by the extent to which it is necessary to preserve
traditional tribal communities-and may be diverted to the extent immigration of non-Indians
has had effect.
80. Id. at 422-3 1.
81. Id. at 425-26 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
82. Id. at 428.
83. Id. at 430.
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essential character. '"' In the "open" part of the reservation, because
of the high percentage of non-Indian fee lands, Justice Stevens opined
that the Yakima Nation had lost the ability to "determine the essential
character of the region" since the Tribe could not condition nonIndian entry on fee lands. 8 Thus, Justices White and Stevens combined forces to hold that the tribe had no jurisdiction to zone nonIndian fee lands where such lands represent a substantial percentage
of the lands in a given area.
The "closed" reservation, however, remained an area over which,
''
according to Justice Stevens, the Tribe retained the power to zone. "
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall joined Stevens and
O'Connor to hold the tribe retained zoning authority in the "closed"
reservation.
The lesson to be derived from Brendale, although subsequent
changes on the Court could modify the analysis, is that tribal zoning
and regulatory authority arising from inherent tribal sovereignty may
depend on the existing Indian or non-Indian character of the area
involved. This "rule" presents complications and uncertainties for
tribes, states, and project proponents. No "bright line" exists regarding the geographic scope of tribal authority.
Brendale may narrow earlier opinions unqualifiedly affirming
tribal zoning powers. In Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian
Tribes," the Tenth Circuit affirmed application of a tribal zoning
ordinance, adopted by the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, to nonIndian owned fee lands on the Wind River Reservation.88 The Knights
argued the tribes had no authority to control the use of non-Indian
fee lands, absent a congressional delegation of authority. 9 In rejecting
the Knights' contention that "congressional delegation of authority
to zone was required, the Tenth Circuit rested its affirmance on inherent tribal power under the third prong of the "Montana test,"
finding that uncontrolled land development would "directly affect"
tribal and allotted lands and, hence, vital tribal interests.
One proper form of the exercise of [inherent sovereign] power
may be in response to "conduct [which) threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe."
The absence of any land use control over lands within the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 433.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438-444.
Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 902-03.
Id.at 902.
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Reservation and the interests of the Tribes in preserving and
protecting their homeland from exploitation justifies the zoning code. The fact that the code applies to and affects nonIndians who cannot participate in tribal government is immaterial. The activities of the developers directly affect Tribal
and allotted lands. 90
A Ninth Circuit court also applied the third prong of the Montana
test to uphold a tribal zoning code as applied to non-Indian landowners on the reservation."'
The analyses of Knight and Sechrist now must be considered in
light of Brendale. Brendale clearly will modify and focus the inquiry
necessary to determine tribal zoning powers. Although land use planning decisions seem to directly affect a community, under Brendale,
that effect alone will not sustain tribal zoning.
B.

Health and Safety Regulation

Tribal health and safety regulation over activities of non-Indians
may also fall squarely within the inherent tribal authority recognized
by the Supreme Court in Montana.Y In Cardin v. De LaCruz,9 a
non-Indian purchased a store on fee land within the boundaries of
the Quinault Reservation. There were certain allegedly dangerous and
unsanitary conditions in the store that violated tribal building, health,
and safety regulations and the tribe closed the store. Thereafter, Cardin filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin imposition of the tribal
ordinances.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the principles enunciated in
Montana controlled. The court concluded that the tribe's regulation
was a permissible exercise of authority:
First, the Tribe is regulating the activities of a non-member
...
who has "enter[ed] consensual relationships with the
[T]ribe ... through commercial dealing." Second, the conduct that the Tribe is regulating "threatens or has some direct

90. Id. at 902-03 (citations omitted); see also Sechrist v. Quinault Indian Nation, 9 Ind.
L. Rep. 3064 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (a tribal decision refusing to rezone non-Indian owned property from a "forestry" zone in part and a "wilderness" zone in part to a zoning classification
which would permit the construction and operation of a recreational vehicle park and campground was upheld). The exercise of such regulatory authority, however, is not without limitation. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988); Men'ion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 542
(10th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) ('The confiscation of property" is a "forbidden
power.")
91. Sechrist v. Quinault Indian Nation, 9 Ind. L. Rep. 3064, 3065 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
92. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Again, Brendae may temper the proper inquiry today.
93. 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982).
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effect on ...the health or welfare of the IT]ribe." Thus, the
Tribe retains inherent sovereign power to impose its building,
health, and safety regulations on appellee's business, notwithstanding appellee's ownership in fee of the land on which
the store stands.9 4
The Ninth Circuit also upheld a shoreline protection ordinance
promulgated by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes as applied to non-Indian lands within the Flathead Reservation. 5 The court
acknowledged the distinctions between Montana (powers not needed
for tribal self-government or to control internal affairs have been
divested) and Colville (only powers which are inimical to overriding
federal interests have been divested), and held that the tribe's shoreline protection ordinance was valid as applied to non-Indian lands
under either test. The court stated that:
If the Colville rule

. . .

is applied ...

the Tribes must prevail

on the regulatory issue, because no significant federal interests
would be impaired by tribal regulation of the riparian rights
of non Indian landowners ...
Even if the Montana rule... is applied.., the Tribes should
prevail .... First, . . . the Tribes are in effect seeking to
regulate non-Indians' use of tribal trust land .... Second,

. .. the conduct that the Tribes seek to regulate [use of the
bed and banks of a lake].

. .

has the potential for significantly

affecting the economy, welfare and health of the Tribes. Such
conduct, if unregulated, could increase water pollution, damage the ecology of the lake, interfere with treaty fishing rights,
or otherwise harm the lake, which is one of the most important tribal resources.9
These cases suggest that tribes retain authority to implement health
and safety regulation where they can show effects on vital tribal interests under the Montana test. However, landholding and demographic patterns almost certainly will affect tribal powers under

94. 671 F.2d at 366.
95. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982).
96. Id. at 963-64. Of similar effect is Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Indian L. Rep.
3025, 3026 (W.D.Wash. 1982), in which a federal district court found an Indian tribe to have
civil jurisdiction to plan, construct, operate and maintain a sewer system to service non-Indian
owned land within a reservation "and to require non-Indian fee simple property owners to
hook up to the system and to pay assessment fees for the services received." Id.The court
found no inconsistency between any overriding federal interests and the Quinault's plan to
administer a comprehensive sewer system on the reservation. Id.
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Brendale. Colville is also likely to remain an independent threshold
when the tribal regulation will intrude upon important federal interests or regulatory schemes. Montana, Brendale, Colville, and their
progeny will continue to inform (or plague) the determination of the
scope of tribal regulatory authority. The lessons of these decisions
should be analyzed carefully with the circumstances of any proposed
project firmly in mind. Such an analysis is necessary to understand
the tribal regulatory side of environmental compliance considerations.
C.

Environmental Protection

Little precedent exists concerning inherent tribal authority to regulate clean air, clean water, hazardous waste, and other areas of
environmental protection. However, Montana, Colville, and their
progeny, together with federal statutes, supply several bases for Indian tribes to institute tribal environmental protection ordinances and
to apply them to non-Indians. Recently, the EPA has announced a
policy favoring tribal responsibility for protection of reservation
environments9 ' and Congress has authorized administrative delegations to tribes for the implementation of some federal environmental
programs. These delegations are consistent with the November 8, 1984
EPA Policy for the Implementation of Environmental Programs on
Indian Lands.9 Such delegations, at present, give rise to more important compliance considerations than inherent sovereignty. However, as tribes develop reservation-based economies we can expect the
development of tribal regulatory codes that are based on principles
of inherent sovereignty and extend beyond the scope of congressional
obligation. This subsection focusses on existing congressional delegations of authority.
1. Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 provide qualified, federally recognized tribes with sweeping new authority to regulate air
quality matters on the reservation." Under the 1990 Amendments,
the EPA Administrator is authorized to treat tribes as states. l ® Such
treatment is available to tribes which the EPA Administrator determines are "reasonably expected to be capable . . . of carrying out
the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the terms

97. See Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Crow Tribe
of Indians v. EPA, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
98. For an excellent discussion of EPA policy, see Eric D. Eberhard, A REvIEW OF TE
ENvmO~sumAL PROTECTioN AGENCY INDIAN LANDs POLICY, ABA SONREEL Indian Lands
Conference (April 1990).
99. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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,,"0, The EPA will promulgate reand purposes of [the Act] ..
gulations to specify the nature of tribal authority, but the amendments limit tribal authority to "the management and protection of
air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other
areas within the tribe's jurisdiction . ... " 1 While the emphasized
language is not defined in the statute, tribal authority to develop
implementation plans to meet the goals of the Clean Air Act is limited
to areas within reservation boundaries. 0 3
Until the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, tribal governments were not granted express regulatory or enforcement au° No mention
thority over Indian reservations by the Clean Air Act.1N
of tribes appeared in the enforcement provisions of the Act. 1 5 Indirect
tribal control over reservation airsheds, however, was provided by a
delegation to tribes under the Clean Air Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program.106 The Act provides in pertinent
part:
(c) Lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations of
federally recognized Indian tribes may be redesignated only
by the appropriate Indian governing body. Such Indian governing body shall be subject in all respects to the provisions
of subsection (e) of this section.' °7
The authority to redesignate reservation airsheds allowed tribes to
indirectly limit or promote industrial development both on and off
the reservation.10' The 1990 amendments, however, may limit any

101. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
102. Id. at § 7601(d)(2XB) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (emphasis added).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (1988 & Supp. 1I 1990). Implementation plans constitute the
primary regulatory mechanism through which national ambient air quality standards are to be
met. See J. GoRDoN ABucu Er A, ENviRomeNTAL LAw HANDBOoK 148-49 (7th ed. 1983).
104. See Patrick Smith & Jerry D. Guenther, Note, EnvironmentalLaw Protecting Clean
Air: The Authority of Indian Governments to Regulate Reservation Air-sheds, 9 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 83, 92 (1981).
105. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c), 7412(d) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
106. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7474 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Under the PSD program,
states and Indian tribes are authorized to designate air quality regions within the states or
Indian reservations as falling into one of three classifications. Each designation permits different
degrees of air quality deterioration. Class I areas are permitted the least amount of air quality
degradation, while class III areas are permitted significantly greater deterioration. Class II is
intermediate. The purpose of the PSD program, in part, is to allow states and tribes flexibility
in determining whether the amount of development permitted is in conformity with state or
tribal development plans.
107. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1988).
108. Should a tribe seek to discourage industrial development on or near the reservation,
its authority to challenge such development is not limited necessarily to matters within reservation boundaries. See 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (1988). Under the Clean Air Act, a tribe could
seek to limit development adjacent to the reservation which might have an affect on reservation
air quality. Id. See also Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 715 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub
nom. Crow Tribe of Indians v. EPA, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981). For example, the Navajo Tribe,
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tribal authority that impacts off-reservation development; the issue
is open.
In Nance v. EPA, 0 9 the Crow Tribe and coal companies challenged EPA approval of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe's PSD redesignation of its reservation airshed from Class II to Class I. The Class
I designation promotes near pristine air quality and severely limits
the permissible air quality deterioration. Stating that the EPA promulgated specific procedures through which a tribal governing body
could redesignate its reservation airshed under the Clean Air Act, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the EPA's approval of the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe's redesignation:
The conclusion can be drawn ... that within the present context of reciprocal impact of air quality standards on land use,
the states and Indian tribes occupying federal reservations stand
on substantially equal footing. The effect of the [PSD] regulations was to grant the Indian tribes the same degree of
autonomy to determine the quality of their air as was granted
to the states." 0
As a result, although the 1990 Amendments may affect the analysis,
tribes may have the ability to control off-reservation development
affecting reservation air quality. "Just as a tribe has the authority
to prevent the entrance of non-members onto the reservation, a tribe
may exercise control, in conjunction with the EPA, over the entrance
of pollutants onto the reservation.""' The "equal footing" concept
provides powerful agreements for tribes seeking to control development adjacent to the reservation.
2.

Clean Water Act

The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act (CWA) authorize
the EPA to delegate program responsibilities to tribes which are similar to those delegable to states. However, a tribe must be able to
demonstrate the ability to fulfill the purposes of the CWA. 12 Under
or at least a part of it, opposed the now abandoned coal-fired power plant planned for Kaiparowits, near the Navajo Reservation. See Lynne E. Petros, Comment, The Applicability of
the FederalPollution Acts to Indian Reservations: A Casefor Tribal Self-Government, 48 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 63, 89 n.144 (1976).
109. 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
110. Nance, 645 F.2d at 714.
111. Id. at 715 (citations omitted).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(3) (1988); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 14,354 (April 11, 1989) (interim
final rule promulgated by the EPA defining procedures for tribes to qualify for treatment as
states under the act). The Clean Water Act (CWA) refers to Indian tribes in the definitional
section. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(4) (1988) (defining a "municipality" to include
"an Indian tribe or an authorized Indian tribal organization"). As a result, tribes may be
regulated entities amenable to citizen suits for violations of the Act. See Blue Legs v. United
States EPA, 668 F. Supp. 1329, 1338 (D.S.D. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Blue Legs v. United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989) (involving RCRA enforcement under
a similar statutory scheme).
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these provisions, the EPA may delegate responsibility to tribes for:
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting; dredge and fill permitting; and water quality standard setting.
The tribe also may obtain federal grants for pollution control programs." 3 The authority delegable to tribes, within the areas listed, is
comparable to that of states. However, the "treatment as states"
provisions of the Clean Water Act are not comprehensive. While tribes
do not hold the same range of authority as do states under the Clean
Water Act, tribes may soon obtain important permitting and water
quality standard setting authority. Developers should bear in mind,
however, that while tribes may possess regulatory authority over certain elements of a project, states may hold sway over other matters.
3.

Safe Drinking Water Act

Under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) amendments of
1986,' 14 tribes are treated as states. Tribes are regulated entities or
"persons" for enforcement purposes."' In addition, the EPA may
delegate primary enforcement authority over drinking water standards
to a tribe that demonstrates its ability to administer the program
effectively. ,16
4. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA)
Under CERCLA," 7 tribes may be treated "substantially the same
... as a state."" 8 As under the Clean Water Act, however, tribal
authority is not as broad as the authority Congress delegated to states.
Tribes-specifically the governing body of the Indian tribe-are to
be treated as states for purposes of: (a) receiving notification of hazardous substance releases; (b) consultation regarding remedial cleanup action; (c) accessing information regarding hazardous substances
maintained by facilities operators; (d) participation in the registration
of diseases and illnesses related to hazardous substance exposure, and
of persons exposed to toxic materials; and (e) development of the
National Contingency Plan."19 Beyond these enumerated areas, Congress has not delegated CERCLA authority to tribes. For example,
tribes are excluded from participation in the "initiation, development,

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

33 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.'
119. Id.

§ 1377(0 (1988).
§§ 300f-300j-11 (1988).
§§ 300f(I0), 300f(12) (1988).
§ 300j-11 (1988).
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
§ 9626(a) (1988).
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and selection of remedial actions to be undertaken" on the reservation, whereas states are involved in that process. 120
5.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

While federal delegations to tribes are increasingly prevalent in
the environmental protection area, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) 12 ' does not yet appear to contemplate a regulatory role for Indian tribes. In Washington, Dep't of Ecology v.
United States EPA, l' " the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the EPA's refusal to certify the State of Washington's RCRA program as applied to regulation of reservation activities.'2 The court
stated that "RCRA does not authorize the states to regulate Indians
on Indian lands."' Unfortunately, "RCRA does not directly address
the problem of how to implement2 a hazardous waste management
program on Indian reservations."'
In the case at bar, as in Nance, the tribal interest in managing
the reservation environment and the federal policy of encouraging tribes to assume or at least share in management
responsibility are controlling..We cannot say that RCRA clearly
evinces a Congressional purpose to revise federal Indian policy
or to diminish the independence of Indian tribes ....
EPA, having retained regulatory authority over Indian lands
in Washington under the interpretation of RCRA that we approve today, can promote the ability of the tribes to govern
themselves by allowing them to participate in hazardous waste
management. To do so, it need not delegate its full authority
to the tribes. We therefore need not decide, and do not decide,
the extent to which program authority under section 3006 of
RCRA is delegable to Indian governments.as
The question whether Tribes have delegated authority under RCRA
remains unanswered. Presumably, Congress will undertake this matter
expressly when RCRA reauthorization is considered.

120. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f) (1988). However, if any remedial action developed by the federal
government involves relocation of tribal members, such remedial action "must be concurred
in by the affected tribal government." 42 U.S.C. § 9626(b) (1988).
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
122. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
123. Id. at 1466. The court did not address whether the EPA could have certified a state
program which extended onto Indian reservations only insofar as it sought to regulate nonIndian activities. Id. at 1468.
124. Id. at 1467-68.
125. Id. at 1469.
126. Id. at 1472. Section 3006 of RCRA authorizes states specifically to assume responsibility for hazardous waste management programs. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988).
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Although RCRA does not expressly authorize Indian tribes to
undertake RCRA management programs, tribes are subject to suit
for RCRA violations. In Blue Legs v. United States EPA, 2 7 tribal
members sued the Oglala Sioux Tribe, the EPA, and others for RCRA
violations. Finding that RCRA violations were widespread on the reservation, the district court concluded that the tribe was amenable to
suit under RCRA's citizen suit provisions. The court found that the
tribe's inherent sovereign status included responsibility to regulate and
operate dumps on the reservation. I2 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. 1 Accordingly, a developer that seeks to cloak
itself with the immunity of a tribe will be laid bare insofar as RCRA
liability is concerned.
6.

Summary

Congressional delegations support tribal environmental jurisdiction in several contexts. 30 Unfortunately, the limited delegations under certain statutes complicate the jurisdictional picture for those
seeking to obtain an understanding of one's environmental compliance obligations.
The propriety of tribal regulatory jurisdictional assertions in other
environmental areas, where there has been no express federal delegation, may depend on whether tribal regulation is preempted by a
comprehensive federal scheme. Alternatively, tribal regulatory authority may be supported by inherent tribal sovereignty given the
EPA's efforts to "promote tribal self-government in environmental
matters."'13 Developers must consider not only applicable federal regulatory schemes, but also tribal regulatory schemes that may be supported by inherent tribal sovereign power.
D.

Occupational Safety And Health Regulation

Research has disclosed no precedent concerning the authority of
Indian tribes to regulate occupational safety and health matters. However, given the standard of review in Montana, 32 tribal regulation of
127. 668 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.D. 1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
128. 668 F. Supp. at 1337, 1339. The court also admonished the EPA to provide assistance
to the Tribe to better administer the reservation RCRA program. Id. at 1339.
129. Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
130. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9626(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
131. Washington, Dep't of Ecology v. United States EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir.
1985). See also Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Indian L. Rep. 3025, 3026 (W.D. Wash.
1982); EPA PoLIcy FOR THE ImPLEmENTATiON OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDI.N LANDs,
November 8, 1984. In the 1984 EPA policy statement, the Agency undertook to provide assistance to tribes on a "government-to-government" basis in order to undertake environmental
regulatory programs on the reservation.
132. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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occupational safety and health may be upheld as applied to nonIndian commercial enterprises located within the exterior boundaries
of an Indian reservation, particularly if that enterprise employs tribal
members.
Federal courts arm split over whether federal occupational safety
and health regulations are applicable to tribal enterprises, and preclude application of tribal regulatory schemes to non-Indian enterprises on a reservation.' 33 In Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products
Industries, Inc. ,'34 the Tenth Circuit rejected the Secretary of Labor's
argument that F.P.C. v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,l " supported the
interpretation that OSHA's generally applicable provisions extended
onto the reservation. 3 6 The Tenth Circuit stated that Tuscarora "does
not apply to Indians if the application of the general statute would
be -in derogation of the Indians' treaty rights.'1 7 The court concluded
that the Treaty of June 1, 1868 between the Navajo Tribe and the
United States limited federal authority to regulate tribally owned businesses, and that application of OSHA to a tribally owned business
"would dilute the principles of tribal sovereignty and self-government
recognized in the treaty.'1 3 The opinion also intimates that Indian
tribes may retain inherent authority to regulate all occupational safety
and health matters on the reservation, and that the exercise of such
tribal authority would not be inconsistent with overriding national
39
interests.
1
The effect of Navajo Forest, however, may be limited due to
the treaty provisions peculiar to the Navajo Tribe in that case. In
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene TribalFarm,140 the Ninth Circuit declined
to follow Navajo Forest and concluded that federal OSHA standards
were applicable to tribal businesses, following Tuscarora. 41 Again,
circumstances peculiar to a given tribe and business will impact the
result. No bright lines may be drawn.

133. Compare Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 710 (10th Cir.
1982) (Navajo Tribe's sovereignty bars application of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). to a tribally-owned business enterprise)
with Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing
NavajoForest Products Industriesbecause the Tenth Circuit's decision rested on the 1868 Treaty
provision expressly granting the power to exclude non-Indians, and holding OSHA applicable
to tribal commercial activities).
134. 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982).
135. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
136. Id. at 116. The Tuscarora language relied upon by the Secretary provides: "[l1t is
now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying to
all persons includes Indians and their property interests." Id.
137. Navajo Forest, 692 F.2d at 711.
138. Id.at 712.
139. Id.at 712-13.
140. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
141. Id.at 1117.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/2

26

Stern: Environmental Compliance Considerations for Developers of Indian
1993

DEVELOPING INDIAN LANDS

E. Summary
The permissible scope of the exercise of tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians continues to develop, but at present is not
capable of general definition. Montana, despite its holding that the
tribe could not regulate non-Indian hunting, and its progeny suggest
broad latitude for the exercise of tribal regulatory authority. However, Brendale strongly signals a regression on this development. Federal statutes, reflecting a variety of policies which range from
encouragement of tribal self-determination to a desire to maintain
national security and uniformity, may further inform the inquiry. As
with many issues of Indian law, a particularized inquiry into present
day and historical tribal, federal, state and private interests is required
to determine the validity of tribal assertions of environmental regulatory authority. 42
IV.

POTENTIAL STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY

Reservation resource developers also must consider the potential
to which their activities may be subject to state control. State authority, however, does not foreclose tribal authority, and vice versa.
Such concurrent jurisdictional regimes yield a host of considerations
for the natural resource developer. Overlapping jurisdiction can yield
inconsistent or conflicting regulatory obligations. For example, the
tribe may not want a tall stack for aesthetic reasons, while the state
requires a tall stack to better disburse the exhaust plume. These types
of matters should be identified promptly and addressed through negotiation or otherwise.
Although the ultimate scope of state environmental regulatory
jurisdiction over reservation-based activities remains to be determined, the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico' 41 boldly announces the proposition that, under the circumstances and facts presented, states may
tax the reservation-based oil and gas production of non-Indian lessees
of Indian tribes, notwithstanding that the tribe already taxes the activity.'" On the heels of Cotton, the Court also announced that states

142. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
143. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
144. Conceivably, Cotton's impact will be limited to the tax arena, and its rationale will
not be applied in other areas. That the majority chose not to address and harmonize the result
in Cotton with California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), where
California state regulation of bingo operations was ousted, supports a taxation-regulation distinction. However, Cabazon Band and other decisions intimate that taxation is the most intrusive jurisdictional assertion, suggesting that if state taxation were permissible so too would
state regulation of the same activity. On the other hand, generalizations are dangerous and
each jurisdictional assertion must be considered thoroughly. See White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
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and local governments have authority, in certain circumstances, to
regulate the use of fee lands inside reservation boundaries. 45 Accordingly, reservation status does not necessarily negate the authority
of the states to tax or regulate non-Indian activities.'"
At present, the extent of state authority over non-Indians is

"riddled with inconsistencies and major questions that are still un-

resolved."'' 47 Developers should attempt to resolve these uncertainties
on a project-specific basis. Fact-specific research may address the
problem; other problems may need to be addressed by contract or
other methods.

Congressional delegation to tribes, of course, may alter the equation when states assert environmental regulatory authority in an area
governed by a federal scheme. Moreover, state authority may be ousted
where there is yet to be a delegation to tribes. In Washington, Dep't
of Ecology v. United States EPA,'" the Ninth Circuit held that Washington lacked RCRA authority to regulate on Indian lands.' 49 As Congressional delegations to tribes flourish, state regulatory jurisdiction
will likely diminish under the analyses employed to determine the
scope of state jurisdiction.
Two interrelated inquiries control questions of the validity of
state jurisdiction. The first rule provides that states may not infringe
upon tribal rights of self-government." 0 The second rule, the Indian

preemption doctrine, is based upon federal policies promoting reservation economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and self-determination, and limits state authority over Indian matters.1'5 Factors

considered in determining the extent of state jurisdiction include: reservation status, land status, whether jurisdiction is asserted over Indians or non-Indians, and the subject matter to be regulated. 5 2 In
addition, treaties, federal statutes, state constitutions, and other en-

145. Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
146. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 147 (1973) (federal government does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian tribes); United States v. Anderson,
736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984) (state has authority to regulate use of waters by nonIndians on non-tribal fee land; tribe has no inherent authority under Montana to oust state
regulatory authority); Sac and Fox Tribe v. Licklider, 576 F.2d 145, 150 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978) ("A state has initial authority to regulate the taking of fish and
game by reason of its police power"; however, a state may not enforce regulations "in conflict
with treaties" or otherwise prevented by federal law); Industrial Uranium Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 387 P.2d 1013 (1963) (non-Indian business activities on reservation are subject to
state taxes).
147. CoMMissioN ON STATE-TRmAL RELATIONS, HANDBOOK: STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS 17
(1984). While published in 1984, the quoted statement remains valid today.
148. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
149. 752 F.2d at 1466-68. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
150. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
151. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136 (1980).
152. CommissoN ON STAm-TRmaAI RELATIONS, supra note 147, at 16.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/2

28

Stern: Environmental Compliance Considerations for Developers of Indian
1993

DEVELOPING INDIAN LANDS

actments may limit the exercise of state jurisdiction. This section will
briefly examine the potential limitations on state regulatory jurisdiction over reservation development activities. An understanding of these
concepts is critical to understanding the potential range of state environmental regulation applicable to any development project.
A.

Disclaimer Clauses

Under state constitutions and federal Enabling Acts,' most western states have "disclaimer clauses" in which the states generally agree
to:
forever disclaim all right and title to . . . lands lying within
said boundaries [of the state] owned or held by any Indian
or Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have been
acquired through the United States, or any prior sovereignty;
and that until the title of such Indian or Indian Tribe shall
have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject
to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and con-

trol of the Congress of the United States

. .

.154

Despite express language that tribal lands remain "under the absolute
jurisdiction ... of the United States," disclaimer clauses do not preclude exercise of state jurisdictional authority over reservation lands
5
or tribal activities.'
In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,'6 the Supreme Court stated
"[tihe disclaimer of right and title by the State was a disclaimer of
proprietary rather than governmental interest."" 7 Accordingly, states
are not precluded from exercising regulatory jurisdiction over the offreservation activities of Indians by virtue of State disclaimer clauses
in federal enabling acts for states entering the Union.3 8
B.

State JurisdictionalAuthority on the Reservation

Historically, assertions of state jurisdiction over Indian lands were
measured by two separate, but closely related, standards: (1) in-

153. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; New Mexico Enabling Act Pub. L. No. 61219 § 310, 36 Stat. 558-59, 569 (1910); see generally, Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,
463 U.S. 545, 561 (1983).
154. N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
155. See, e.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (New Mexico gross receipts tax valid as applied to Indianoperated ski resort located off-reservation); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60
(1962).
156. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
157. Id. at 69.
158. See also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering,
P.C., 467 U.S. 138 (1984); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 570 n.20 (1983).
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fringement and (2) preemption. Infringement analysis considers the
impact of the proffered state regulation on tribal sovereignty, while
the preemption test examines whether comprehensive federal regulation and federal Indian policies foreclose the state assertion of authority. While these two standards of review have competed for
primacy over the years, the Supreme Court's most recent statements
appear to incorporate infringement considerations into a preemption
analysis.
1. The Infringement Test
Before the preemption test developed, infringement analysis prevailed in the review of state authority on the reservation. In Williams
v. Lee,1"9 a case involving a non-Indian's attempt to collect money
due from a Navajo tribal member arising from on-reservation transactions, the Supreme Court stated the standard of review governing
the exercise of state jurisdiction over Indian lands and tribes: "[Aibsent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them." 60 This test guided determination of state regulatory, taxing, and adjudicatory jurisdiction over
reservation activities, until the preemption and infringement analyses
coalesced. Infringement analysis must now be considered in light of
preemption considerations.
2.

Preemption of State Regulation

The Indian preemption doctrine now plays the key role in limiting
state authority over non-Indian reservation activities. 6 1 The Indian
preemption doctrine is not applied in the same fashion as traditional
preemption analysis.162 Rather, attributes of Indian tribal sovereignty

159. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).

160. Id. at 220.
161. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Crow
Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 901-03 (9th Cir. 1987), summarily aff'd, 484 U.S. 997 (1988);
Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), modified, 665 F.2d 1390, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 916 (1982) (elimination of state severance tax imposed on all coal mined and sold
in state); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (state regulation of water rights on reservation preempted by creation of
reservation); see generally, Robert D. Wilson-Hoss, Comment, Jurisdiction to Zone Indian
Reservations, 53 WASH. L. REv. 677, 691 (1978).
162. The traditional federal preemption test applied by the Supreme Court provides that
application of state law is not foreclosed "in the absence of persuasive reasons - either that
the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has
unmistakenly so ordained." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1963); see also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). Perhaps Indian matters could be
considered "subject matter [which] permits no other conclusion" in view of tribes' unique
status in the federal system, however, the Supreme Court has not held consistently that state
regulation of Indian matters is preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S. at 161.
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provide a backdrop for the application of preemption principles.16
As a result, state authority over reservation lands is limited more
stringently than would be expected under traditional preemption analysis. As with other areas pertaining to regulatory jurisdiction over
reservation activities, "no rigid rule" is available through "which to
resolve the question whether a particular state law may be applied
to an Indian reservation or to tribal members," or to non-Indian
activities on the reservation.'"
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 65 Arizona sought
to impose motor carrier license and use fuel taxes on a non-Indian
owned logging company, which had contracted with the tribe to cut,
load, and transport timber on the Fort Apache Indian Reservation.
The Supreme Court stated in that "several basic principles with respect to the boundaries between state regulatory authority and tribal
self-government" had been established.'" Congress had announced
a "firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development."' 67 In light of this policy, according to the Court,
an express congressional intention to preempt the application of state
law is not required.'" "[S]tate authority over non-Indians acting on
tribal reservations is preempted even though Congress has offered no
explicit statement on the subject."' However, contemplating a balancing test, the Court considered the state's regulatory interest:
When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest
in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest. More
difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity
on the reservation. In such cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of
both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of
tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty,
but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of
the state, federal and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry de-

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
Post Co.

See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1980).
White Mountain Apache, 448 U.S. at 142.
448 U.S. 136 (1980).
Id. at 141.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 151 (citing Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971)); Warren Trading
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217

(1959).
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signed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.' 70
In White Mountain Apache, the Court agreed with the Tribe that
"the federal regulatory scheme [over timber resource use] is so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed
[by the state] in this case."' 71 The Court concluded that imposition
of the state taxes would threaten overriding federal interests, including
a reduction in tribal revenues, and that the economic burden of the
state taxes would ultimately fall on the tribe.'7
7
the SuIn California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,'1
preme Court rejected the state's effort to regulate tribal bingo operations on the reservation. In the face of important federal and tribal
interests in promoting tribal self-sufficiency, the requirement of federal approval of tribal bingo regulations and management contracts,
and that the bingo services were developed on the reservation, the
Court found no legitimate state interests justifying state jurisdiction.174 In 1988, by summary affirmance of the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court rejected Montana's coal severance tax on reservation
coal mined by non-Indians."'l Congress intended the Indian Mineral
Leasing Act,' 76 under which the subject coal leases were granted, to
ensure the greatest return to tribes, the Ninth Circuit noted.'" Where
tribal resources are involved and because the state tax made tribal
coal less competitive, the Ninth Circuit presumed that no legitimate
state interest existed.178 Because the state failed to overcome the presumption and demonstrate that the tax was tailored to support state
interests, the tax was held inapplicable.
More recently, and in contrast to these results, the Supreme Court
affirmed New Mexico's authority to impose its severance taxes on
the value of oil and gas that non-Indians produce from the Jicarilla

Apache Reservation.' 79 The decision, the Supreme Court's first recent
opinion on the important "dual taxation" issue, complicates the analysis of state jurisdictional authority.
170. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1980) (citations
omitted).
171. Id. at 145-49.
172. Id. at 149-150. Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New
Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 844 n.8 (1982), provides a comparable analysis, where the actual economic burden fell on the tribe by contract, notwithstanding that the "legal incidence" fell
on the tribe's non-Indian contractor.
173. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987).
174. Id. at 221; see also Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
175. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987). alf'd, 484 U.S. 997 (1988).
176. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1988).
177. Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d at 898.
178. Id. at 899-901.
179. Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
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The Court not only rejected the contention that Cotton Petroleum Company made in state district court-that state severance taxes
violated the Indian and Interstate Commerce Clauses-but also rejected in sweeping terms federal preemption and related infringement
arguments.1 80 The majority's review of the Indian Mineral Leasing
Act of 1938,181 discussed in Crow Tribe,'2 disclosed no express prohibition of state taxation. To the contrary, the Court found that,
particularly with respect to Executive Order reservations, prior statutes suggested an intention to allow state taxation of non-Indians'
oil and gas production from tribal lands.'83 The tribal sovereignty
"backdrop" analysis described in White Mountain Apache was narrowed. In Cotton Petroleum the "backdrop" that the Court focused
on was the narrow one of historical application of state taxes to
mineral leasing on Indian lands,'8 whereas in prior decisions the Court
considered the broader "backdrop" of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and fostering economic development on the reservation. 8 5
The Cotton Petroleum Court distinguished its decisions in White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker'86 and Ramah Navajo School
Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico,'" which had found
federal preemption of certain state taxes of federally regulated nonIndian business activity on Indian lands. The Court found that while
the federal regulation of oil and gas development in Cotton Petroleum
was "extensive," it was "not exclusive" like the federal regulation
in Bracker and Ramah.IU The Court concluded that a direct and
substantial adverse impact on a tribe is required to support preemption of state taxing authority.'"
Cotton Petroleum may be considered to limit the breadth of the
Indian preemption doctrine. Statements that statutes "no more express a congressional intent to preempt state taxation of oil and gas
lessees", 190 suggest a retreat from the broader rulings of the Court

180. Cotton Petroleum Company presented no factual record in the trial court material
to, or designed to develop, a preemption claim. Its initial theory was a commerce clause analysis
not requiring development of a factual record regarding tribal regulation and services in the
area.
181. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1988).
182. Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987).
183. However, the Court reaffirmed its ruling in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 759 (1985), that states may not tax a tribe's royalty interest in gas produced from
reservation lands.
184. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176-83.
185. See, e.g., Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 16566 (1980).
186. 448 U.S. 136.
187. 458 U.S. 832.
188. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186.
189. See id. at 187.
190. Id. at 183 n.14.
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in White Mountain Apache and Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona
State Tax Commission. 91
After Cotton Petroleum, the unanswered question is whether the
Court might reach a different conclusion if presented with a record
actually aimed at establishing a federal preemption claim, showing
that state taxation interferes either with a tribe's ability to raise tax
revenues or inhibits oil and gas development on tribal lands. Cotton
Petroleum cannot be read as validating all state taxes; the Cotton
Petroleum majority found "no occasion to reexamine our summary
affirmance of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
may not
that Montana's unique severance and gross proceeds 'taxes
92
be imposed on coal mined on Crow tribal property.' $
Also unanswered by Cotton Petroleum is the question whether
the Court would employ the- same analysis in a state regulatory, as
opposed to tax, matter. Cotton Petroleum and County of Yakima
both suggest that state tax jurisdiction commands an analysis different
than state regulation. 93 Illustrative of this point is that the majority
opinion in Cotton Petroleum does not even cite the Court's 1987
Cabazon Band decision, which was a state regulation case. However,
if the Cotton Petroleum analysis is applied in the context of state
regulation, states may exercise greater regulatory control over activities on Indian lands.
These opinions must be considered by businesses seeking to develop or manage tribal resources. Whether state jurisdiction is ousted
in the environmental regulatory area would involve factors such as:
(a) federal delegation to tribes; (b) federal regulatory schemes generally; (c) nature of the regulated community; (d) state, federal, and
tribal environmental protection interests; and (e) other factors described in the case law. While there may be no way to assure oneself
about the potential applicability (or inapplicability) of state jurisdiction over a development project, one should develop an understanding
of the possibilities in order to structure any contractual arrangement
to the best advantage of the developer and tribe.
In summary, state regulation of non-Indian on-reservation activities is scrutinized under preemption analysis overlain with consideration of adverse impacts on tribal sovereignty. Without, and in
certain cases even with, legitimate state interests at stake, state regulation will fail where tribal rights of self-government are directly
and substantially affected and where federal policies and regulatory

191. 448 U.S. 160.
192. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186 n.17. See Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
484 U.S. 997 (1988), summarily affg', 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987).
193. See, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 63, 693-94 (1992).
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schemes comprehensively promote and regulate on-reservation conduct of Indians and non-Indians. 9' However, a particularized inquiry
is required to determine the scope of state regulatory authority.
Threshold state jurisdictional authority questions must be resolved in
the planning or early stages of any proposed development.
V.

FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT STATUTES

AFFECTING INDIAN LANDS

Federal laws governing natural resources development on Indian
lands may present additional sources of environmental regulatory requirements with which developers must comply. Regulations governing leasing of tribal lands for mining 95 and governing development
agreements under the Indian Mineral Development Act of 198 2 96 were
on the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs' drawing
board when this article went to press.'9 These regulations, when ultimately promulgated, will likely include recognition of environmental
controls and reclamation. At a minimum, the regulations will provide
opportunities for tribes to control development through environmental protection and other regulatory means. Developers should be informed of these regulations and their impact on development.
VI.

ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY
CONTRACT

Although not unique to reservation development, developers
should pay careful attention to negotiating contractual obligations in
the environmental protection arena. Because tribes retain both proprietary and governmental interests, contracts can define the scope
of tribal environmental regulatory authority.
Business may seek certainty in applicability of regulatory schemes
in negotiations with a tribe. Agreements should pin down regulatory
obligations and the rights and duties of the parties when jurisdictional
disputes arise. Cooperative agreements between states and Indian tribes
also present an avenue for resolving jurisdictional disputes before they
arise or affect on-reservation business. States and Indian tribes have

194. Preemption may also be found where a comprehensive tribe regulatory scheme has
been developed to implement a federal policy. Generally for preemption to be found in those
circumstances, authority should have been delegated by the federal government to the Tribe.
See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Fisher v. District Court,
424 U.S. 382 (1976).
195. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1992).
196. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-08 (1988).
197. A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) was published November 21, 1991 concerning revisions to regulations governing mining on tribal and allotted lands, presently codified
at 25 C.F.R. Pts. 211 and 212 (1992), and concerning regulations to implement the Indian
Mineral Development Act (IMDA).
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been exploring these possibilities recently.'" Such agreements could
address regulatory, adjudicatory and taxing authority, perhaps providing sound expectations for business development and saving litigation expense for all concerned.
VII.

CONCLUSION

While reservation-based resource development projects present a
host of complicated environmental compliance considerations, those
complications are not insurmountable. Although many lessons can
hopefully be gleaned from the foregoing discussion, a single central
theme arises: careful planning is a necessary prerequisite to any business project on Indian lands. In this area, there is no substitute for
a particularized inquiry into tribal and reservation history, the details
of the proposed development, the applicable (or potentially applicable) tribal, state, and federal laws, the prevailing political inclinations of state, local, tribal and federal governments and their
respective enforcement priorities and regulatory initiatives. At the outset of any planning program, developers should:
(a) Contact tribal officials to ascertain potentially applicable tribal
regulation and the existence of any cooperative regulatory
agreements with other governments that may apply;
(b) Contact the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to determine applicable federal regulations and policies, including
the extent of any federal delegation to the tribe involved;
(c) Contact the local Bureau of Indian Affairs officials to discuss
applicable environmental and land use regulation within their
spheres of influence;
(d) Contact state and local environmental regulatory officials to
determine the extent to which state environmental regulatory
programs are asserted to apply to Indian lands activities; and
(e) Examine these matters in light of specific tribal, reservation
and land status historical information: (i) to determine the
validity of the jurisdiction assertions; (ii) to identify whether
the proposed development is feasible; (iii) to ascertain where
regulatory conflicts arise; and (iv) to determine whether regulatory authorities are willing to work together to develop a
regulatory approach that protects the environment while permitting development of an economically viable and efficient
project.
With careful planning, jurisdictional issues and related matters
can be resolved. While the planning and negotiations may be more
198. See COMMISSION ON

STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS, supra

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/2

note 147.

36

Stern: Environmental Compliance Considerations for Developers of Indian

1993

DEVELOPING INDuAN L"Ds

113

protracted at the outset than other projects, the efforts will pay dividends for all parties over the long-run
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